INTRODUCTION
The illegalisation of political parties presents a dilemma for democracies. On the one hand, banning a party may have profound consequences for the enjoyment of liberties, representation and political competition. It is often the mark of authoritarianism. On the other hand, democracies typically ban parties they claim promote authoritarian forms and violent regime change, serve the interests of a foreign power, undermine the territorial integrity of the state or are racist. Proscription may, therefore, help protect democracies from their enemies and promote the rights of vulnerable citizens.
There is a small literature on the proscription of political parties, mostly consisting of single case studies and some comparative studies drawn from the disciplines of law and philosophy (Karvonen, 2007; Sajó, 2004; Niesen, 2002; Fox and Nolte, 2000; Brunner, 2000; Harvey, 2004; Franz 1982; Kirchheimer, 1961) . Most of these studies tend not to question official rationales for the proscription of political parties and when they do, fail to develop systematic, comparative or sufficiently detailed arguments. Looking beyond official rationales, I pick up on arguments meriting further development, particularly Karvonen's (2007) argument that 'established democracies' tend to legislate fewer restrictions on political parties than 'new' or 'semi-democracies' and Sajó's point that proscription is more likely in postcommunist states because political uncertainty makes them less willing to accept the risk that political liberties may be abused (2004: 214) . In short I aim to lay the foundations for more systematic examination of the proscription of political parties by developing plausible hypotheses about the impact of democratisation on a state's decision to ban a political party.
I explore the impact of democratisation on proscription in two main ways. In order to determine whether 'degrees of democratisation' can usefully distinguish different classes of party ban, I conduct a survey of twenty two party bans in twelve European states. This survey reveals two distinct classes of proscription, namely 'new' and 'incomplete' party bans. I then go on to explore the literature on democratisation to determine whether distinctive features of 'new' and 'incomplete' democracies can help explain why these bans occur. Case studies of 'new democracy bans' in Germany, Austria, Latvia and Russia and 'incomplete democracy bans' in Greece and Russia illustrate pertinent arguments from the literature.
PROSCRIPTION OF PARTIES IN EUROPE
There is no up-to-date or comprehensive list of parties banned in liberal democracies, 2 although the proscription of political parties is probably more common than usually recognised. This article focuses on the proscription of parties in postwar Europe, mainly because relevant primary and secondary sources are more abundant. However, if temporal and spatial parameters are extended back to the interwar years and beyond Europe, it becomes evident that many democracies have initiated or completed proceedings to ban a political party at some point in the last century (Loewenstein, 1937; Kirchheimer, 1961; Capoccia, 2001; Fox and Nolte, 2000) .
The first columns of Tables 1 and 2 (below) show significant or well-known examples of proscription in Europe. Selected cases reflect something of the range of parties banned in terms of ideology and salience, and include examples from established and more problematic democracies, and from states with recent experience of democratisation. Most parties listed in these tables fit a broad definition of political parties as organisations that 'seek influence in the state' including office and parliamentary representation; that formulate a preferred set of policies or futureoriented programmes for political change; and contest elections at least some of the time (Ware, 1995: 5) . For some small parties, such as the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin (UMO Ilinden-Pirin) and the National Bolshevik Party, participation in elections is very difficult due to the hurdles of registration. For others, such as the Workers Party and the National Democratic Party (Austria), extraparliamentary forms of opposition may be more or equally important. Indeed, for such cases, the boundaries between political parties, political associations and movements -and sometimes terrorist groups -may be rather blurred. On the other hand, the above definition of political parties cannot fully capture the essentially non-democratic nature of former ruling parties in fascist or communist regimes.
Furthermore, parties included in Tables 1 and 2 In terms of size and political significance, parties included in Tables 1 and 2 vary enormously, from the mass communist and fascist parties banned after the end of World War Two and collapse of the Soviet Union, to parties only able to capture a very small percentage of the vote, like the National Democratic Party (Austria), the Workers Party and Centre Party 1986. Between these extremes fall parties like Batasuna, which was able to capture as much as 18% in its best showing in Basque elections in 1990 and the Welfare Party, which was the largest party after 1996 elections (with 22% of the vote) and part of a coalition government for nearly a year.
And finally, it should be noted that some party bans are sequential. This is the case for bans in Spain, where all bans since the proscription of Batasuna in 2003 have sought to prevent Batasuna re-emerging under a new name. It is also the case for various proKurdish and Islamist parties in Turkey.
NEW DEMOCRACIES AND THE PROSCRIPTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
This cannot be the place to enter into complex debates on the general concept of democracy, other than to note Dahl's five criteria (1998: 37-8 ' (1991: 271) . While there is disagreement over whether democratisation ought to be conceived as a dichotomous or continuous variable (Huntington, 1991: 11) , most theorists accept some variation of the following sequence of stages: transition; institutionalisation or installation; consolidation, persistence or habituation; and possibly deconsolidation (Rustow, 1970; Linz, 1990; Morlino, 1994; Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; O'Donnell, 1994: 56) .
By 'new democracy' I mean states at the 'transition' stage of a process which could transform an authoritarian regime into a fully consolidated democracy. This corresponds to what Rustow (1970) defines as the 'preparatory' and 'decision' phases of democratisation. For Rostow, this is when political leaders in a nationally unified political community, involved in a prolonged, profound and inconclusive struggle, decide to accept diversity in their community and institutionalise some critical aspect of the democratic procedure to resolve conflict (1970: 352-6) . Later theorists acknowledge more varied paths to democracy, including imposition by external actors, imposition by regime elite, mass-led reform or the revolutionary take over of power (Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Linz, 1990; Huntington, 1991: 109-163 It is possible to identify a class of parties banned by new democracies bans by measuring the proximity of the decision to ban a party to a democratising state's first multiparty election. The first multiparty election is rarely the opening event of a democratic transition, but as we have just seen, the successful realisation of free elections is a defining moment of all transitions (Linz, 1990: 157) . Table 1 There is considerable debate about whether it is appropriate for new democracies to ban political parties and whether such measures are effective. Bans to counter the reemergence of former non-democratic ruling parties may contribute to political stabilisation in the uncertain conditions of democratic transition, or serve as a 'backward barrier' against insurgence (Minkenberg, 2006: 27; Niesen, 2002: 250) .
Bans on former ruling parties may help symbolically demarcate the authoritarian past, 'disclose a new republic's understanding of the paradigmatic wrongs of the old regime' and 'specify the new regime's normative orientation towards to the future' (Niesen, 2002: 275) . The ECHR, and others, have been willing to tolerate greater limitations on political rights in the special conditions of democratic consolidation (see also Sajó, 2004: 220; Gordon, 1986: 390) . 3 In contrast, Huntington's approach on the question entails: don't prosecute or punish, don't forgive or forget (1991: 231). He argues that in some cases, political costs may outweigh moral gains, and that experience to the 1990s suggested that transitional justice is rarely delivered in a sufficiently timely or systematic manner (ibid: 211-231). Linz is equally ambivalent (1990: 159).
Nevertheless, new democracies face particular problems which make the option of proscribing a political party more compelling. New democracies are typically characterised by uncertainty, polarisation, political tension and significant disagreement over the pace and forms of democratisation (Rustow, 1970: 354, 356; Linz, 1991: 153; Huntington 1991: 109-164) . As Karl and Schmitter describe it, …the transition… is subject to unforeseen contingencies, unfolding processes and unintended outcomes. The 'normal' constraints of social structure and political institutions seem temporarily suspended: actors are often forced into making hurried and confused choices; the alliances they enter are usually fleeting an opportunistic (1991: 270).
There is great uncertainty about 'which interests will prevail and what the outcome of the democratic process will be' (Morlino, 1994: 572) . There is sometimes a strong possibility that anti-democratic forces from old regime or from the opposition might prevail (Rustow, 1970: 354; Linz 1991 : 153, Huntington, 1991 . Minorities may be particularly vulnerable to the tendency for democratisation to promote communalism and ethnic tensions, which as Huntington and others explain, may be due to the fact that 'in many situations the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to tribal, ethnic and religious constituencies ' (1996: 6; Zakaria, 1997: 38) .
In contrast, the marginalisation of extremists and anti-system parties is often regarded as a benchmark for democratic consolidation (Linz, 1991: 158; Diamond, 1999: 67-8) .
Moreover, in an established democracy, uncertainty about the rules of the game are considerably reduced (Rustow, 1970: 361; Morlino, 1994: 572) . As Diamond explains, this is achieved through institutionalisation -a move towards routinised, recurrent, predictable, patterns of political behaviour -which enhances 'mutual security' and helps draw 'reliable boundaries around the uncertainty of politics'
(1996: 55).
The proscription of political parties in Russia and Latvia in 1991 illustrate the impact that uncertainty, political polarisation and the threat of counterrevolution from agents of the old regime may have on decisions to ban political parties. Democratisation in Latvia and Russia took place in the context of the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, uncertainty about the status of unilateral declarations of independence in Latvia and elsewhere, and the constant threat of counter-revolution on the part of communist party hardliners (Daniels, 1993; Danks, 2009) . Indeed, coup attempts by pro-Soviet hardliners in Latvia (and Lithuania) in January 1991 and in August 1991 in the Soviet Union serve as a backdrop against which communist parties in these states were banned.
In a high-profile and politically significant case, the former ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was banned within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic for being an accomplice in the August 1991 communist hardliner's coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (Feofanov, 1993: 633) . The party was banned by Edict of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The Russian
Constitutional Court was soon called to judge the validity of the ban -or more specifically, whether the President had the power to ban political parties -and the constitutionality of the CPSU itself (Feofanov, 1993; Brunner, 2002: 28-30) . By the time Yeltsin issued his edict, the CPSU had ceased to play its constitutional 'leading role', as power shifted to alternative political institutions in the Republics, and Constitutional Court deliberations took place when the Soviet Union was defunct.
The trial itself was, according to Yuri Feofanov, something of a 'Russian Nuremberg', which put the Communist party, its ideology, crimes and record at the helm of the Soviet state on trial (1991: 636). In a complex ruling, the court found that the prohibition of the 'high organisational structure' of the CPSU (and the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), or those elements of the party apparatus which had controlled the Soviet state, were now unconstitutional (Feofanov, 1993: 637; Brunner, 2002: 30) . However, it also ruled that the territorial party organisations -or those elements of the party that were more like public associations -were legal and would be permitted to carry out activities in accordance with the law (ibid). By 1993, the party effectively reconstituted itself as the Another distinctive feature of new democracies is the challenge of 'dealing justly with the previous nondemocratic rulers' (Linz, 1990: 158; Huntington, 1991 Huntington, , 2009 Herz, 1978) . As Herz observes:
the most difficult choice that seems to confront all of the [new democracies] is between policies of at least temporary discrimination, in order to eliminate the danger (from right or left) of restoration of dictatorship, and freedom for all groups and factions to organize and operate. Similarly…a choice must be made between actively combating totalitarian and similar ideologies, and allowing everyone to compete freely in the marketplace of ideas ' (1978: 561) .
The 'torturer problem', or responding to demands for justice for human rights violations committed by individuals from the old regime, is particularly difficult (Linz, 1990, 158; Huntington, 1991, 211-231) . There is also the related issue of purging supporters and partners of the old regime from the armed forces, bureaucracy and certain civil society institutions (Linz, 1990, 158; Herz, 1978, 561) .
Huntington observes that different 'modes of transition' are associated with different approaches to the issue of purging and punishing protagonists of the old regime: In the case of 'third wave' regime transformation (regime reformer-led change) former officials of the authoritarian regime were almost never punished. In case of replacement (opposition group-led change) they almost always were. In transplacements (regime reforms and moderate-opposition led change) this was an issue to be negotiated. Where there is strong support for, or an established practice of, punishing those associated with the former regime for past crimes, or for purging them from positions of authority in the state, there may also be a strong rationale for banning them from participation in democratic politics through the formation of political parties (Herz, 1978: 561) . Party bans in Germany and Austria in the immediate aftermath of world war two illustrate the explanatory potential of 'modes of transition' for explaining proscription in democratic states, although more research is needed to confirm its broader significance.
Democratisation in Germany and Austria took place after total defeat in war and involved external intervention on the part of the occupying Allied Powers (Niesen, 2002: 253; Knight, 2007) . In both countries it took the form of 'externally monitored installation where the total debellicization of the… state gave to the Allied powers full control of political development' (Linz, 1990: 113) . Democratisation in these countries was as a from of what Huntington calls transition by 'replacement', where opposition groups gain strength until the old regime collapses or is overthrown (1991:
142), although in the cases at hand, military intervention by external actors was a more decisive trigger for democratisation than domestic opposition. As mentioned earlier, transition by replacement tends to be associated with policies punishing and purging protagonists of the old regime (Huntington, 1991: 211-231) . This expectation holds for the proscription of political parties in Austria and Germany (and in Italy), although it took different forms in different countries.
In Germany, a ban on parties which might take up the mantle of the defeated National Court found the SRP to be unconstitutional because of its 'essential affinity' to the Nazi party and because it did not support principles constituting the 'liberal democratic order' (Niesen, 2002: 273; Franz, 1982: 57) . According to Kirchheimer, the SRP 'barely disguised its kinship with National Socialism', 'revived ultranationalist philosophies', and 'used Nazi techniques to vilify and denounce the exponents of the democratic system ' (1961: 151) . The SRP obtained some support in certain Northern Lander, but its 1951 success of 11% of the vote in Lower Saxony
Land elections was a highpoint soon followed by the initiation of proscription proceedings (Kirchheimer, 1991: 152) . Article 21 (2) 
INCOMPLETE DEMOCRACIES
Huntington observes that so-called 'waves of democratisation' are usually accompanied by liberalisation or partial democratisation in political systems that do not become democratic (1991: 15). Moreover, democratisation waves have been followed by 'reverse waves' where 'some but not all countries that previously made the transition to democracy reverted to non-democratic rule' (ibid). These processes produce incomplete democracies.
By 'incomplete democracy' I mean states that have set out on a process of democratic reform, and obtained some -but not other fundamental -characteristics of established democracies. Established or 'consolidated' democracies, are those where democracy becomes 'the only game in town' (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 15-16) , and which meet high standards of democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino, 2005) . In established democracies: no politically significant group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or to secede from the state; the overwhelming majority of people believe further political change must emerge from the democratic process, even in the face of severe economic and political crisis; and all political actors become habituated to resolving political conflict by democratic means (Linz and Stepan, ibid; see also Diamond, 1999; Rustow, 1970) .
There is some disagreement about the threshold of democratic consolidation.
Huntington, for instance, adopts a minimalist conception of 'electoral democracy', where a political system is 'democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote ' (1991: 7) . This conception implies 'the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organise that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of election campaigns' (ibid). This minimalist conception, however, has been criticised for ignoring other dimensions of democracy, such as minority rights or the existence of domains of power beyond the reach of democratically elected representatives (Diamond, 1999: 31) . Maximalist definitions, articulated most clearly in work on democratic 'quality', include additional criteria, namely the absence of reserved domains of power for non-democratic actors, horizontal accountability, extensive guarantees for political pluralism, political and civil freedoms, and the rule of law (Diamond, 1999: 11-12; Diamond and Morlino, 2005 : xii-xxix).
Despite some blurring of the boundaries between consolidated and unconsolidated democracies, scaled measures of democratisation, such as the widely-used Polity IV democracy scores, permit identification of a class of incomplete democracy bans. Table 2 shows Polity democracy scores in the year it banned a party. 4 Scores are allocated along a spectrum ranging from 0 to 10, where ten is the highest level of democratisation. Scores are determined by qualitative evaluations of the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and the competitiveness of political participation. Parties in the top three rows of Table 2 have been considered in the context of new democracy bans. Those cases with a democracy score ranging from five to seven may be considered 'incomplete democracies bans' given that banning states initiated democratic transitions and yet fell short of top categories of democratic quality in the year the ban occurred. Once again, it must be acknowledged that this is an imperfect measure for identifying the 'degree of democracy' in different states. One problem is that democracy scores in a specific year -the year of proscription -do not accurately capture the degree of democratisation over the medium to longer term. A good example is the democracy score for Greece -considered in more detail below -which fell from a score of eight to seven soon after the proscription of the Communist Party Defective democracies are 'democratic' because there is a 'meaningful and effective universal "system of elections" (free, secret, equal and general elections) regulating access to political power" (ibid: 35). However, they may deviate from democratic standards in three ways: In an exclusive democracy, certain groups are systematically denied access to political power, due to voting restrictions, discriminatory party laws or electoral system distortions (among other things) (ibid: 36-7). In a domain democracy, certain political domains are controlled by groups (such as the military) which are not democratically elected or legitimated (ibid: 36). This is essentially the same as O'Donnell's conception of 'delegative democracy', which 'rests on the premise that whoever wins the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office ' (1994: 55) . There is vertical accountability, including periodic elections along with freedom to form parties and organisations, but horizontal accountability through checks on presidential power are weak or nonexistent (ibid: 61-2) and government is paternalistic, populist and illiberal (ibid: 55).
Merkel and Croissant's third kind of defenctive democracy is illiberal democracy, where 'representatives elected in free and general elections breach these fundamental rules, if the mutual checks on power are eliminated by the circumvention of parliament and the judiciary, or if the rule of law is deliberately or chronically damaged' (ibid: 36). Zakaria (1997) develops a similar conception of 'illiberal democracy', where the procedural requisites of democracy are divorced from the goals of 'liberal constitutionalism', which seeks to promote individual liberty and autonomy through the rule of law. In an illiberal democracy, elected power holders 'routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive…citizens of basic rights and freedoms' (Zakaria, 1997: 22) . Distinctions between liberal and illiberal democracy also emerge in differences between 'high' and 'low' quality democracies elaborated by Diamond and Morlino (2005) and their collaborators. While higher quality democracies provide for 'liberty on paper', they also develop a 'culture of liberty', where freedoms are used and properly upheld by an independent judiciary, and where rights derogations are limited (Beetham, 2005: 34) . 'Lower quality' democracies, however, may provide 'rights on paper' but will subvert these standards by practices that include 'exclusionary rules on registration of voluntary associations, trade unions or political parties' and 'discriminatory application of registration requirements' (ibid, 38).
In short, various essential characteristics of incomplete democracies generate the expectation that the proscription of parties will be more likely in incomplete democracies, especially the absence of effective checks on executive power, the systematic circumscription of political participation or underdeveloped commitments to liberal constitutionalism. The explanatory potential of these theoretical Nevertheless, at the time in question, both states bore the hallmarks of 'defective' or 'illiberal' democracies described above (Merkel and Croissant, 2000; Zakaria, 1997) .
As Diamandouros observes, the post-World War II Greek political system was 'indelibly marked by the effort of a politically triumphant Greek Right to institutionalise [an] anti-communist state ' (1986: 143) . Even before the Colonel's coup and military rule, the Right dominated a 'guided democracy' or 'circumscribed parliamentarianism' which marginalised the left and centre and employed a 'paraconstitution' denying equal rights to those whose commitment to the political regime and established social order might be in doubt (ibid: 143).
Formed in 1918, the Communist Party of Greece has drifted in and out of legality.
Throughout its existence, the party has been characterised by its close association with the Soviet Union and orthodox communism (Kousouros, 1965; Kitsikis, 1988) . The party's size and influence grew immensely after it led Greek resistance to German occupation in the 1940s (Kousoulas, 1965) . From this powerbase, the communists launched a revolutionary insurrection and civil war , eventually quashed with British and US support. The Party was outlawed by the Greek government in December 1947, at the height of the civil war, and at the point when communist guerrillas established an alternative government in the mountains (Kousoulas, 1965: 248) . However, before long, the illegalisation of the Communist Party took the form of a lapsed ban, as the party staged a comeback through a front organisation, the United Democratic Left. This party, which was formed in 1951, involved other political forces, but pursued many pro-communist policies. It won an average of 14.2% of the vote in the six elections it contested on its own (Kitsikis 1988: 98) . It returned to full legality in 1974, when the Colonels relinquished power (Diamandouros 1986: 160) . It is not possible to discuss single instances of non-registration or outright dissolution in any depth, but the following points serve to illustrate the range of parties affected.
The small liberal opposition party, Liberal Russia, was refused registration in July 2002 for technical faults in submitted documentation, while the same faults in United Russia's documentation were overlooked (Wilson, 2006: 324) . The party was re- (Danks, 2009: 315-6, 318; Gel'man, 2008: Table 2 shows.
'Militant democracy' is the paradigmatic explanation for the proscription of political parties in liberal democracies. Militant democracy is a concept principally developed by legal scholars to specify a class of legal systems equipped with constitutional and legislative instruments permitting the state to protect itself against extremists through measures such as proscription of political parties (Fox and Nolte, 2000; Sajó, 2004; Brunner, 2000) . It draws on Loewenstein's seminal warning against the 'suicidal lethargy' of interwar democracies (1937: 423-30 ) and the vivid demonstration provided by the Nazi's rise to power of how democracy may be abused by its enemies.
All states banning parties examined here can be considered militant democracies.
However, the 'militant democracy' paradigm cannot fully account for the proscription of political parties given that so-called militant democracies use proscription in widely differing contexts and that some states equipped with the instruments of militant democracy fail to use them at all. Nor can it address the question of why only some democracies come to be classed militant democracies in the first place. A number of political triggers may lead to the execution of laws against extremist political parties or the creation of new legal instruments for proscription. It may be that a party is only banned when its competitors expect the ban to win them more votes or seats or when it helps them reach or maintain their position in executive office (Schumpeter, 1947; Downs, 1957) . Some research on proscription in 1950s Germany suggests such explanations may be relevant. Kirchheimer, for instance, observes that Socialist Reich It may also be more appropriate to examine the behaviour of extremist parties themselves, particularly whether a party's orientation to violence is a better indicator of the likelihood of proscription. In most cases examined here, parties have been banned for direct or indirect involvement in violent political acts, whether past or present. It is also likely that orientations to violence was an important part of what made parties banned for their anti-democratic ideas -such as SRP and the German Communists -so politically undesirable. Alternatively, it may be unnecessary to take the grave and possibly counter-productive course of banning a party if it can be marginalised through the electoral system, collusion of mainstream parties or the targeted use of the criminal justice system against racism, political violence or offensive speech acts (such as holocaust denial). Further research on this and the other general hypotheses are needed to develop a fuller understanding of why democracies and democratising states ban political parties.
